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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

it is generally granted only if the debtor has been guilty of that
unreasonable or vexatious delay referred to in the statute for
there was no common-law duty to pay interest. 49 It was for that
reason, therefore, that the Illinois Supreme Court in part reversed
the holding in Woodruff v. City of Chicago,50 a suit brought to
recover payments made under a special assessment proceeding
for a street widening which had been abandoned by the municipal
ity, because it was of the opinion that the city had done nothing
to impede the creditor in his efforts to recover the money so
paid other than to insist upon a judicial determination of its
liability 'in that respect. 5 1

III.

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

In the years since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act most
of the debatable problems concerning the conduct of litigation
under the reformed system of procedure have been ironed out
although questions do still arise. Cases which have dealt therewith are here summarized and arranged in much the same order
as these questions are likely to develop in the conduct of a given
case.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDES

As the fruits of litigation can rise no higher than the source,
the practitioner's first concern should be with aspects of jurisdiction for if that is lacking all other efforts will prove wasted. No
questions have arisen as to the power of the major nisi prius
courts to entertain suits' and only one minor and indirect point
49 Totten v. Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920).
50394 Ill. 542, 69 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946), in part reversing 326 Ill. App. 577, 63
N. E. (2d) 124 (1925).
5' In that regard, see Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N. E. (2d) 41 (1943),
reversing 313 Ill. App. 407, 40 N. E. (2d) 565 (1942).
1But see the discussion dealing with the jurisdiction of city courts in divorce
matters elsewhere in this survey under the topic of Family Law. Attention might
also be called to legislative revision of the statute relating to courts for cities
and incorporated towns: Laws 1947, p. 766, S. B. 36, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 37,
§ 333 et seq.; to some increases in compensation for judicial officials: Laws 1947,
p. 773, S. B. 154, p. 776, S. B. 580, and p. 796, S. B. 187; as well as to some
changes in pension arrangements for judges: Laws 1947, p. 775, H. B. 136, and p.
774, H. B. 512.
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has been made with respect to the inferior tribunals. Jurisdiction
of magistrates and justices of the peace is county-wide 2 and, by
constitutional mandate, is required to be uniform in character.'
Any attempt, therefore, by a municipal corporation to provide
that prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances should
be instituted before some favored magistrate or justice of the
peace would be clearly unconstitutional as well as directly violative of the provisions of the Cities and Villages Act.4 Such being
the case, it was held in Harms v. Wuerth5 that a favored magistrate could not complain of the revocation of an ordinance directing prosecution of violators before him, even though the apparent
effect thereof was to deprive him of the fees of his office during
his term in contravention of another constitutional provision, 6 for
the reason that no provision of that character should have been
enacted in the first place.
Jurisdiction also necessarily involves control over the person
of the defendant, typically obtained by service of valid process.
Under present rules, a summons is to be made returnable on a
return date not less than twenty days nor more than sixty days
after its date and then only upon the first and third Mondays in
the month.7 There is further direction that the summons should
.be served, .if practicable, more than twenty days prior to the first
return date,8 but in case it is not, the defendant is still allowed
not less than twenty days in which to appear. The defendant in
Bogden v. Laswell9 argued that as the summons therein was issued
on a date only nineteen days before the first return date it was
necessarily null and void and, even though personally served,
could not become the basis for the acquisition of jurisdiction
despite the fact that more than twenty days elapsed between the
date of service and the alternative return date. The court held
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 79, § 16.

3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 21.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 10-9.
5396 Il. 73, 71 N. E. (2d) 26 (1947).
6 Il. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22, and Art. IX, § 11.
7111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 259.4(1).
8 Ibid., § 259.4(3).
9 331 Ill. App. 395, 73 N. E. (2d) 441 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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that the error, if any, in no way prejudiced the defendant in view
of the fact that it was not practicable to serve the summons in
time to require his attendance on the first return day and he lost
no rights because he was thereby given additional time in which
to appear.
Substitute service, however, is permissible only within statutory limitations. A previously unnoticed limitation upon the right
to serve the Secretary of State as agent for the non-resident automobile operator in causes of action growing out of the use of the
local highways may be observed in a New York case, that of
Smalley v. Hutcheson,1 which has significant implications as to
the Illinois law. The non-resident driver there involved was killed
in a highway accident in this state. The injured plaintiff first
brought suit in Illinois against the New York administrator for
the tort of his decedent and served process in the fashion suggested by the Motor Vehicle Act. 1 ' The defendant appeared specially and challenged jurisdiction on the ground that the service
12
provision extended only to cases against the operator himself.
His objection appears to have been sustained by the nisi prius
court but since no review was sought of that holding, no report
thereof appears among the Illinois cases. When the injured plaintiff later sued the administrator in a New York court the defense
of the statute of limitations was upheld against the contention
that the pendency of the Illinois proceeding was sufficient to prevent the running of the statute. The local attorney, in such a
situation, ought to give serious consideration to the advisability
of taking a chance in bringing suit in this state on the expectation
of being able to vindicate the service of process in contrast to the
obvious remedy of suing the wrongdoer 's estate at the place of
13
his domicile.
10296 N. Y. 68, 70 N. E. (2d) 161 (1946).

11 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 951/.,, § 23.
12 In that respect, see Jones v. Pebler, 296 Il. App. 460, 16 N. E. (2d) 438 (1938),
noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rm'mw 69, reversed in 371 Ill. 309, 20 N. E. (2d)
592 (1939), as to validity of service on non-resident owner for tort of agent operating the automobile on a local highway.
13 As to whether or not local administration of the tort-feasor's estate is permissible under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, §§ 206-7, see Furst v. Brady, 375 I1. 425,
31 N. E. (2d) 606 (1941), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 293.
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The existence of valid jurisdiction will also involve aspects
of venue which ought not be overlooked. As originally enacted,
the Civil Practice Act directed that whenever the parties to litigation appear "without making objection to the venue" no order
14
in the cause should be deemed void for want of jurisdiction.
There was occasion to believe, therefore, that if the defendant
chose to default a judgment for failure to contest would be valid
even though the plaintiff had instituted the suit "in the wrong
county. 15 Any such thought, however, was nullified by the decision in Heldt v. Wactts' 6 wherein it was held that it was necessary
to vacate a default judgment, entered for want of appearance or
answer, on the ground that, as the suit had been brought in a
county lacking venue of the cause, the court was without jurisdiction to enter any judgment whatever. 7 By that holding, it would
seem that venue is to be regarded as much of a jurisdictional
fact as is the power to hear and determine the controversy itself
or the power to control the person of the defendant. As venue is
essentially a matter of trial convenience rather than one of jurisdiction, the holding mentioned would seem to go too far, but there
is occasion to believe that its effect has been sterilized for the
legislature has since amended the statute so that it now reads:
"No order, judgment or decree shall be deemed void for want of
jurisdiction because rendered in the wrong venue. ""' It is likely,
therefore, that except in cases where judgment is taken by confession' 9 the defendant must hereafter act in a prompt and positive fashion to deprive the court of its jurisdiction should the suit,
by chance, be instituted in the wrong county.
14 See- Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 135.
Civil Prac. Act Annotated, Foundation Press. Inc., Chicago, 1933,
15 Compare Ill.

p. 28, with McCaskill, Ill. Civil Prac. Act Annotated, 1936 Supp., pp. 18-9. As to
judgments by confession, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174(5).
16329 Ill. App. 408, 69 N. E. (2d) 97 (1946), noted in 35 Ill. B. J. 315.
17 See also Argondelis v. Rosin. 330 Ill. App. 463, 71 N. E. (2d) 908 (1947),
where suit was brought in Cook County on a foreign cause of action and an
attempt made to serve defendant at his alleged residence in Will County. A
default judgment was declared a nullity by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110,
§ 131.
18 Laws 1947, p. 1350. S. B. 398: Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110. § 135.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174(5).
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The pleader should, of course, be conscious of the fact that
the action he is about to begin should be promptly brought to
avoid the possibility of it being barred by limitation. In that
regard, two cases are worthy of notice. The present statute declares that a civil action shall be "commenced" by the filing of a
complaint. 20 Since the limitation statute imposes no further requirements, 21 it was decided in Massman v. Duffy 22 that the mortgage foreclosure proceeding there involved was not barred, even
though no attempt was made to serve process until long after the
limitation period had expired, for the complaint had been filed in
apt time. More complicated, however, is the problem of the right,
by amendment, to expand a suit promptly brought to cover other
claims and parties. There is occasion to believe that the confusion created by the decision in Piper v. Epstein23 may have been
abated by the holding in Bairstow v. Phillips State Bank & Trust
Company,24 for the court there specifically held that an amendment which does add new causes and parties, after the limitation
period has expired, may not be given retroactive effect so as to
prevent the raising of the defense of the expiration of the limitation period. 25 The fact that the added claims happened to relate
to the same property described in the original foreclosure suit
begun in apt time was held not be enough. The test to be applied
would seem to be one as to whether or not the evidence offered to
support the initial claim and the relief originally sought could be
made applicable to the claim asserted through the amendment.
If not, the two claims are to be treated as distinct demands so the
second one is not to be regarded as instituted until the time the
amendment is made.2 6
Choice of an appropriate remedy may also be important for,
20 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 129.
21 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 11.
22 330 Ill. App. 76, 69 N. E. (2d) 707 (1946).
23 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945),
REVIEw 170.

noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAw

24 331 Inl. App. 187, 72 N. E. (2d) 871 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 170, purports so to do as to causes which "grow
out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading."
26 See also Mann v. City of Chicago, 31.5 Ill. App. 179, 42 N. E. (2d) 862 (1942),
noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW Rvnw 100.
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despite the abolition of distinctions which existed at common
law, 2 7 a legal proceeding today should proceed on the same
theories, and be modelled along the lines of, the earlier remedies.
In that respect, it might be noted that, as replevin provides a
much more efficient remedy for the restoration of possession of
personal property than any other known action, the old remedy
of detinue has been falling into disuse. It is remarkable, therefore, to find two detinue cases being argued in the reviewing
courts during the past year although it is not surprising to note
that the plaintiff lost in each instance because of a failure to
refresh his recollection as to the essential elements of this littleused action. In Martin v. Cole,28 the judgment for the defendant
was affirmed since the plaintiff had not alleged that he owned the
articles in question or was in possession thereof when the same
were taken by the defendants and also because he failed to give
that certainty of description made requisite by the form of judgment to be entered in his behalf. In Germania Club v. City of
Chicago,2 9 where recovery was sought of money which had been
contained in certain slot machines confiscated from the plaintiff's
premises, the plaintiff lost because it was unable to show that it
had either title to or right to possess the coins in question and
could not recover simply on the weakness of the defendant's title.
Confining limitations on other common-law remedies, however,
have been made to yield before the ameliorations of the reformed
procedure. Ejectment, for example, could once be utilized only
for the consideration of purely legal rights and defenses. Although that action was not originally comprehended within the
scope of the Civil Practice Act,30 the statute covering that particular action has been amended so as to make the reformed procedural methods apply.3 1 By reason thereof, it was considered
proper, in Horner v. Jamieson,32 to permit the defendant in an
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 155.
28331 Ill. App. 597, 73 N. E. (2d) 633 (1947).
29 332 Ill. App. 112, 74 N. E. (2d) 29 (1947).
30 IH. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 125.
31 Ibid., Ch. 45, § 10 and § 50.
32394 Ill. 222, 68 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946), noted in 25 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REvIW
232.
27
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ejeetment action to interpose an answer and counterclaim setting
forth an equitable title as a defense to the same extent as would
be permitted in other civil actions. The holding was foreshadowed
by other recent decisions 8 but it is the first time that the court
has recognized a complete reversal in what had been, prior to
1934, the accepted practice of refusing to accept equitable titles
or defenses to defeat an action in ejectment.3 4 This fact has,
therefore, resulted in a change in the scope of existing legal
remedies.
Perhaps the most important function performed by equity is
that of adapting the law to the constantly changing needs of social
and economic life. This process of adaptation, although not conspicuous, is noticeable in the cases handled in the past year. In
Ward v. Sampson,35 for example, important distinctions were
made between general jurisdiction, i.e. the power to hear and
determine specified types of causes, and jurisdiction in equity, or
the substantive propriety of granting equitable relief in a particular case, even though the court did not make use of such terminology. The husband and wife there involved, several years
ago, became parties to a divorce suit which eventually culminated
in a decree in favor of the wife granting her a divorce and requiring the husband to convey title to the residence, held in the names
of the husband and wife as joint tenants, to his wife alone although
she established no special equity thereto.8 6 No conveyance in fact
was made but the wife continued to reside in the premises until
the time of her death, followed thereafter by occupation on the
part of one of her heirs. The ex-husband subsequently sued for
possession and an accounting, claiming sole ownership as a surviving joint tenant, and prayed for removal of the divorce decree
33 In Firke v. McClure, 389 Iii. 543, 60 N. E. (2d) 220 (1945), the plaintiff in
an ejectment action was held to have admitted affirmative matter in the answer
for failure to reply thereto, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 164. See
also State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr, 283 Ill. App. 337 (1936), noted in 25 Ill.
B. J. 79, where an equitable defense was accepted in a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding.
34 See, for example, Metzger v. Horn, 312 Ill. 173, 143 N. E. 408 (1924).
35 395 Ill. 353, 70 N. E. (2d) 324 (1946).
36 The existence of some special equity is made necessary by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,

Ch. 40, § 18.
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as a cloud on his title on the theory that the same, at least as to
the land, was a nullity. The heirs responded with a counterclaim
requesting specific enforcement of the original decree in their
favor. The trial court therein granted a decree in favor of the
husband, but the Supreme Court reversed, treating the complaint
as a bill of review or one in the nature thereof. As that device is
available, after time for appeal or writ of error has expired, only
where the original decree has been obtained by fraud or rendered
by a court lacking in jurisdiction, the court was obliged to examine
the circumstances relating to the entry of the original decree.
Since there was no claim of fraud, the issue was narrowed to one
of jurisdiction. It was at this point that the Supreme Court,
without so saying, distinguished between equitable jurisdiction in
general and its narrower meaning in relation to divorce, but it
concluded that, as the court had power of both the subject matter
and the parties, any mistaken judgment leading to the original
decree did not make the same void but voidable only, hence not
open to collateral attack. Any error in ordering a conveyance
when special equities were lacking had disappeared by the passage of time, consequently enforcement of the original decree was
ordered.
The "clean hands" doctrine is well-established but considerable divergence of opinion exists as to the circumstances calling
for its application. The case of Mills v. Susanka3 7 is interesting
in that regard for it contains a concise and enlightening summarization of the Illinois decisions on that point. While it decides
nothing new, the presence of such an excellent resume of the cases
might well prove helpful to a person dealing with the problem.
Regulations covering the use of class suits were again considered in State Life Insurance Company v. Board of Education,3 8
another offshoot of the tax anticipation warrant troubles that
have beset the Chicago Board of Education since the depression. 39
3.7 394 Ill. 439, 68 N. E. (2d) 904 (1946).
38 394 Ill. 301, 68 N. E. (2d) 525 (1946).
39 See also Newberry Library .v. Board of Education, 387 Il1. 85, 55 N. E. (2d)
147 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvrEw 82, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 413, and
Leviton v. Board of Education, 374 I1. 594, 30 N. E. (2d) 497 (1940).
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The plaintiffs therein were holders of unpaid warrants and sought,
through a representative suit, to compel the board to distribute
funds on hand, or to be collected, pro rata among the several
warrant holders. Right of representation was denied on the
ground that, while the several holders were interested in the same
insolvent fund, their interest in the method of distribution was not
common, for those having low numbers in numerical order of issue
would be paid in full if payment in numerical order was proper,
while those having high numbers would be interested in obtaining
pro rata distribution throughout the entife series. As the issue
in controversy was the proper method of distribution, the maintenance of a representative suit where there was at least partial
conflict between the parties suing and those being represented was
not considered feasible.
An equity court ought to grant relief where conscience and
reason require it, so the outcome of the case of Rice v. United
Mercantile Agencies of Louisville4 0 is one to be expected. In that
case, a judgment creditor caused levy to be made and sale had
of homestead premises worth more than $1,000 but failed to see
to it that the sheriff summon three householders to serve as commissioners to set off the homestead exemption due the judgment
debtor. 4 1 A deed was issued to the purchaser in due course for
failure to redeem. Subsequent thereto the debtor made a conveyance in remainder to his daughter who expended money in
enhancing the equity in the premises. Thereafter the debtor sued
to remove the sheriff's deed as a cloud on the title. He was met
with the defense that he was not entitled to relief because he could
have made application in the original suit, in proper time, to
have the sale nullified but had failed so to do. The Supreme Court
agreed that the trial court, in the law action leading to the judgment and sale, had ample power to see to it that its processes were
executed according to law but nevertheless found that the purchaser's failure to take action and the equities which had arisen
40 395

Ill. 512, 70 N. E. (2d) 618 (1947).
Stat. 1947, Ch. 52, § 10.

41 111. Rev.
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by reason of the debtor's conveyance in remainder to his daughter
warranted equitable relief.
Elaboration upon the equitable doctrine of election, as applied
to interests created by will., was provided through the case of
Ness v. Lunde. 42 The testator there had made provision for his
widow in lieu of "dower, homestead, widow's award and of any
and all rights or interest she might have or claim in my estate as
heir," but made no disposition of the fee in the real estate after
the widow's death. The widow survived, retained the use of the
land and accepted the personalty bequeathed, and thereafter died
intestate. Her heirs then sued for partition of the real estate
claiming to be entitled to one-half thereof which, they asserted,
43
had devolved on the widow under Section 12 of the Descent Act.
The heirs of the testator, on the other hand, asserted full ownership to the land on the theory that the widow, by electing to take
under the will, had lost any interest she might otherwise have
acquired in the real estate. The court recognized the existence of
the equitable doctrine of election as a basis for barring the
devisee, who had accepted benefits under the will, from claiming
rights which, if allowed, would defeat the full operation of the
will. That doctrine was held inapplicable, however, inasmuch as
no attempt had been made to devise the reversion but the same
had been left to pass by operation of law and there was no inconsistency in keeping the property bequeathed and also the share
inherited by descent. The heirs of the widow were, therefore,
held entitled to have partition.
Cases dealing with specific performance of land contracts are
noted elsewhere, 44 but one other equitable proceeding deserves
attention. The case of Montgomery Ward & Company v. United
4
Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees Union, C. I. O. 1
squarely presents the issue as to whether or not a court of equity
should enjoin against the making of defamatory statements. The
42

394 Ill. 286, 68 N. E. (2d) 458 (1946).

§ 12.
See post, this survey, under the title Property.
45330 Ill. App. 49, 70 N. E. (2d) 75 (1946). Appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court is pending.
43 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 39,
44
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plaintiff therein, a well-known mail-order house, charged the defendants with a conspiracy to foment distrust among its employees and customers by means of a widespread campaign of
untrue statements regarding its business, its policies and is supervisory employees. Defendant's motion to dismiss having been
denied and the defendant refusing to plead further, an injunction
was issued because the fact of the conspiracy had, at least for this
purpose, been admitted by the motion. On appeal, the Appellate
Court reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed for want of
equity on the ground that the issues grew out of a labor dispute
between the plaintiff and certain of its employees represented by
the union; that such employees had the right to publicize the
"facts" of the dispute; that publication of the "facts" necessarily included publication of what the parties to the dispute
claimed to be the "facts," and that to restrain such statements
by a court acting as censor would be to interfere with freedoms
of speech and press. The fact that a conspiracy was charged did
not change the result because the court indicated that to permit the
chancellor to assert the power of censorship over publications
alleged to be the product of a conspiracy would be to open the way
to the muzzling of all publications purporting to be the product
of the efforts of two or more individuals.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS.

Surprisingly little has been said about the essentials of good
pleading or the manner of statement which should be found therein. It would seem that there should be no occasion "for a discussion as to the meaning of the words 'English language,' 1146 at
least in connection with the constitutional requirements that judicial proceedings should be preserved in that and no other language. 47 The use of abbreviations in pleading ought to be discouraged for such things are not a part of the common body of
words generally accepted as constituting the English language in
use among the people of this nation. If used, then, under the
48 See Stein v. Meyers, 253 Il1.

199 at 204, 97 N. E. 295 at 297 (1912).

47 Ill. Const. 1870, Schedule, §18.
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holding in Saline Branch DrainageDistrict v. Urbana-Champaign
Sanitary District,48 there is a likelihood that all the pleader's
efforts will come to naught for it was there held that the abbreviated phrase "U & C Sanitary Dist." could not be deemed to
be an adequate description of the defendant, hence a judgment
rendered in that form was unenforcible.
The only other development, from the standpoint of the plaintiff, has to do with the right to join a number of claims or parties
in the same suit. Equity rules against multifariousness had been
declared still applicable in Gombie v. Taylor Washing Machine
Company49 despite the apparent authority for the joinder of several distinct equitable claims belonging to separate plaintiffs to be
found in Section 23 of the Civil Practice Act.5 0 It was there said
that the joinder section was designed merely to change the rules
in law actions. That holding has been subjected to criticism, 51
but the first real opportunity to review the question did not arise
again until the Appellate Court of the First District was asked
to pass on the appeal taken in Village of Melrose Park v. Prairie
State Bank.52 In that case, a number of village employees who
had each given wage assignments and judgment notes for monies
advanced by the defendant bank combined in one equity proceeding to enjoin the prosecution of twenty-one separate suits at law
against the several plaintiffs based on the individual notes so
made. The application for relief was made on the theory that the
bank had, in a prior suit against the village employer, effected a
compromise settlement of the several wage claims in full satisfaction of the notes in question but was nevertheless asserting the
nonpayment thereof as the basis for the separate lawsuits. The
defendant's claim of misjoinder and multifariousness was rejected,
and the decree affirmed, on the ground that the joined claims grew
48 395 Ill. 26, 69 N. E. (2d)

251 (1946).
929 (1937),

49290 Ill. App. 53, 7 N. E. (2d)

noted in 15 OHIAoAo-KENT REVIEW

303.

50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 147.
51 See Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N. E. (2d) 228 (1939).
That
suit, however, involved the joinder of several plaintiffs having separate claims in
tort for nuisance.
52330 Ill. App. 18, 69 N. E. (2d) 729 (1946).
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out of the same facts, involved the same legal questions, and that
to permit joinder would avoid a multiplicity of suits. 3 The decision, to say the least, represents a closer adherence to the liberality
expected of the reformed procedure than has been shown heretofore.
Some issues of importance to defendants about to prepare
pleadings should be noticed. The practice concerning the use of
a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act 54 is subject to some confusion,5 5 but the case of Classen v.
Heil 6 is even the more remarkable because the motion therein
was sustained on a ground on which it should not have been when
a valid ground for its denial was present but was not utilized.
The plaintiff therein, as administrator, sued for damages for the
wrongful death of his decedent. The defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue because all
parties were under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
right of action, if any, was vested in the decedent's employer. The
motion was supported by the affidavit of the defendant who, at
the trial, would have been an incompetent witness. 57 Plaintiff in
no way challenged the correctness of the motion or the accompanying affidavit and the suit was dismissed. On appeal, that
action was affirmed, the court holding that the ground for dismissal was proper under Section 48 and the plaintiff, by failing
to object, was prevented from questioning the sufficiency of the
affidavit. The court was unquestionably correct as to the second
point, but the reference in Section 48 to "capacity to sue" relates
primarily to plaintiff's ability, in law, to be a litigant 5 s rather
than to his "right" to recover as the holder or owner of an undisputed cause of action,5 9 hence the use of the motion to present
53 The Court made no mention of the decision in the Taylor Washing Machine
Company case, supra, in its opinion.
,54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 172.
55 See comment in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 28-9 concerning the case of
Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 (1945).
56 330 Ill. App. 433, 71 N. E. (2d) 537 (1947), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 194.
5T Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 51, § 2.
58 As, for example, that the plaintiff is an alien enemy, or claims to be administrator when in fact he is not.
59 See Armstrong, "Summary Judgments in Illinois," 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Rzviaw 215 at 229.
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a defense to the effect that the plaintiff in fact has no case falls
beyond the limits of the present statute. If such a ground should
exist,0° it would seem desirable to amend Section 48 by legislative
action rather than by judicial decision.
An important distinction to be observed, when an answering
defendant seeks to avail himself of the fact that he lacks knowledge of the plaintiff's allegations, is noted in the case of it re
Braun's Estate.6 1 Although such a defendant is generally entitled
to a constructive denial, provided he will swear to his lack of
knowledge, and thereby avert an admission of the facts,6 2 yet if
the charge is one as to the execution of an instrument in writing
his denial of execution, to be sufficient, must be accompanied by a
positive verification unless verification be excused. If the person
seeking to deny execution be not the one alleged to have executed
the instrument, he must still accompany his denial with a verification based at least on information and belief.6 3 In the case mentioned, an executor sought to place the burden of proof on the
claimant to show the genuineness of the signature on notes
allegedly executed by the decedent but his answer was held to be
64
insufficient, hence amounted to an admission of genuineness,
because he merely swore that he lacked knowledge on the point
and failed to verify as to his information and belief on the subject. The decision may seem harsh, but it is in line with precedents elsewhere and should be carefully noted.65
Wide latitude exists for the use of a counterclaim by a def endant against the plaintiff for the provision thereon is such that the
demand thereby asserted need have no relationship whatever to
the demand which provides the basis for the original suit.6 6 It
60 Clark, "The New Illinois Civil Practice Act," - U. of Chi. L. Rev. 209 at 211.
61330 Ill. App. 322, 71 N. E. (2d)

364 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
62111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 164(2).
63 Ibid., § 159(2).
64 An insufficient denial is equivalent to an admission under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 110, § 164 (2). The Civil Practice Act provisions were applicable to the probate proceeding by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 155.
65 See Clark, Code Pleading (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1942), 2d Ed., pp.
593-7.
66 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 162.
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was urged in Hedlund v. Miner6 7 that, despite this, the older rule
should still be applied to partition proceedings so that a counterclaim filed therein should be confined to rights arising solely out
of the property sought to be partitioned and should not be made
the basis for litigating extraneous matters. The court, however,
declined so to hold in the belief that there was no occasion to
multiply costs and litigation particularly when the procedure
adopted by the defendant appeared to have specific sanction in
the law.6 8
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

Nothing new has been decided with respect to rules regulating
the production of evidence, but one or two minor points have been
established on trial procedure. The obvious right of a litigant to
be present during the trial of his case so as to assist his counsel
conduct the suit or the defense is a necessary corollary of due
process, both in civil and criminal cases. 9 If he abuses the privilege, as by unwarranted outbursts or other contemptuous conduct,
then, according to the decision in Kopplin v. Kopplin,70 the remedy is not to exclude the litigant from the courtroom but to visit
upon him the penalty for contempt of court. The failure of the
litigant's counsel to object to the removal of his client from the
court room was there held no excuse for the erroneous ruling nor
did it obviate the error committed.
Protest against the expensive practice of requiring a reference in every foreclosure case to a master in chancery to take
testimony and report his conclusions thereon has led to the enactment of a short statute relating to proof in such cases. The trial
court is required to hear all except the more complicated cases of
account in open court; the sworn complaint becomes evidence as
67 395 Ill. 217, 69 N. E. (2d)
68

862 (1946).

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 106, § 43, declares that the provisions of the Civil

Practice Act shall apply to partition proceedings except as otherwise therein provided. That statute is silent on the subject of cross-demands. For the prior practice, see Kearney v. Kirkland, 279 Ill. 516, 117 N. E. 100 (1947).
69 In the latter situations the right is expressly guaranteed: Ill. Const. 1870, Art.

II, § 9.
70330 I1. App. 211, 71 N. E. (2d) 180 (1946).
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to all matters not controverted; and, in case of total default, a
decree is to be entered upon affidavit disclosing the amount due. 7 1
In that same vein, notice was taken last year of the decision in
Simpson v. Harrison72 which declared it to be error to refer such
cases to a special commissioner. It was there suggested that if
the parties appeared before the special commissioner and made
no objection to the fact that he was coram non judice, the result
might be that any error would be waived. That suggestion has
now been translated into decision by the holding in Phillips v.
O'Connel 73 for the court there refused to reverse on the precise
ground suggested, distinguishing the earlier holding on that very
fact.
Heretofore, a motion by the defendant in an equity case, at
the close of the plaintiff's evidence, for a finding in defendant's
favor operated to bar the defendant from offering any testimony
in case his motion was denied. In 1941, the legislature amended
Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act so as to provide that, upon
an adverse ruling, the defendant might adduce evidence in his
74
own behalf if he wished and thereby waive the prior motion.
The probable purpose of that amendment was to produce a uniformity in trial practice by assimilating the equity view to that
which had existed in law cases, but in so providing the legislature
neglected to indicate what action should be taken in the event the
trial court erroneously sustained defendant's motion and its holding was reversed on appeal. Upon return of the case to the trial
court, should defendant be allowed to proceed as if no such motion
had been made or ought he be precluded from making any defense
since the legislature had only partly remedied the situation? The
Supreme Court answered that question, in Reiter v. Illinois
National Casualty Company,7 5 by stating that it would be proper
to allow the defendant to proceed with his defense. At approxi71 Laws 1947, p. 1226, S. B. 516; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.95, § 22b.

72328 I1. App. 425, 66 N. E. (2d) 494 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Pjmvmw 32-3.
73 331 Ill. App. 511, 73 N. E. (2d) 864 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
74 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 188(4).
75397 Iii. 141, 73 N. E. (2d) 412 (1947), in part reversing 328 Ill.App. 234, 65
N. E. (2d) 830 (1946).
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mately the same time, the legislature supplemented the statute in
question with language pointing in exactly the same direction.7 6
The rendition of a proper judgment is also a matter of significance. Although Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes the court to enter more than one judgment in a civil case,7 7
the general purpose underlying that statute was simply to provide an effective means by which to avoid the complications and
delay which might arise if the court was obliged to enter a unit
judgment when several distinct claims were being asserted in
78
one suit under the liberality relating to joinder which now exists
or where, to do so, would require plaintiff to wait until the whole
of his demand were tried when a part thereof was admittedly
due.7 9 The Appellate Court decision in Shaw v. Court ney s served
to introduce a possible misconception by apparently attributing
to that section an authority, not expressed therein, for the rendition of separate judgments against joint tort-feasors8 1 That
imputation has now been flatly rejected by the decision in Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi Company 2 wherein it was held error to
accept separate verdicts, and to pronounce separate judgments
thereon, dividing the damages between defendants sued as joint
tort-feasors when their concurrent negligence had caused the
plaintiff's harm. The use of separate judgments, therefore, should
be confined to cases where distinct and separate demands are
being asserted in the same suit.
If an erroneous judgment has been entered there may be
occasion for an application to vacate the same. In that regard a
76 Laws 1947, p. 1348. S. B. 66; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 188(4). See also
Laws 1947, p. 1349, S. B. 67; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 216, as to powers of
reviewing courts in such situations.
77 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174.
78 Ibid., §§ 147 and 168.
79 Zimmerman v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 324 Ill. App. 370, 58 N. E. (2d)
267 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 252.
80317 Il. App. 422, 46 N. E. (2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REVEw 249.
81 Although the Supreme Court affirmed, it was careful to say that its opinion
should "not be considered as giving sanction to, or disapproval of. any of the
questions of law" considered by the Appellate Court: 385 Ill. 559 at 565, 53 N. E.
(2d) 432 at 435 (1944).
82 331 Il1. App. 192, 73 N. E. (2d) 4 (1947).
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division of authority appears to have developed between the First
and the Fourth District Appellate Courts over the right of a
judgment debtor, upon judgment by confession, to move to vacate
the judgment because of the existence of a counterclaim held by
the debtor against the creditor, even though that counterclaim be
extraneous to the original demand upon which the judgment by
confession was secured. The First District, in State Bank of
Blue Island v. Kott,8 3 had held that the liberality of construction
demanded by the Civil Practice Act 4 required treating such a
counterclaim as a defense "on the merits" sufficient to warrant
vacation of the judgment by confession. 5 The Fourth District,
however, in the case of Vella v. Pour, 86 has reached an opposite
conclusion, preferring to follow the older view expressed in Stead
7 It might be possible to draw a distinction between
v. Craine.8
the two cases on the basis of the fact that in the second case, while
ground for an equitable counterclaim for reformation might appear to exist, no attempt was made to offer it as a counterclaim in
fact but rather to utilize it simply as a defensive measure. There
is no doubt, though, that the former of the cases represents a
desirable advance over the older procedure.
DAMAGMS

Although inferential evidence may, in proper circumstances,
be used to show the extent of loss or damage which has been
suffered, the question of when and to what extent such inferential
evidence satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proof seems to be a
matter of constant recurrence. Three examples arising in the
period of this survey illustrate this fact. In Di~val v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Company,88 plaintiff sought damages for a sickness
allegedly produced by drinking from a bottle of the defendant's
beverage product which contained a deleterious substance. A
83323 Ill. App. 27, 54 N. E. (2d) 897 (1944),
REwVIW 31-2.
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 128.
85 Ibid., § 259.26.
App. 355, 68 N. E. (2d) 631 (1946).
86 329 Il.
87 256 Il1. App. 445 (1930).
88 329 Il1. App. 290, 68 N. E. (2d) 479 (1946).

noted in 23 CHICAGo-KLNT LAw
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verdict was given based on damages which had not, and in the
nature of things could not have, been proven by direct evidence.
Verdict and judgment were upheld when the court declared it was
sufficient for the plaintiff to describe the acts leading to the discovery of the deleterious substance and the details of his subsequent illness. The same lack of proof of a causal connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury is displayed
9 but again it was held that plaintiff's narrative
in Ford v. Friel,"
as to how she was thrown from defendant's bus by a sudden lurch
of the vehicle at the moment when she was alighting plus a description of the pain, suffering and medical care that followed thereafter were sufficient to sustain an award of damages. In one other
case, that of Garshonv. Aaron,90 the same result was achieved in a
suit to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when
he fell through a defective guard-railing on a stairway located on
the demised premises. The defendant-landlord urged that the
verdict for plaintiff should be disregarded as the pain and suffering upon which the damages were assessed did not represent an
injury attributable solely to the accident in question, but the court,
on the basis of the case last mentioned, affirmed the award as
originally given.
A problem concerning the right to an award of compensatory
damages for loss of prospective profits was generated in Industrial Natural Gas Company v. Sunflower Natural Gas Company.9 1
Under an agreement of several years standing, the plaintiff there
involved had been supplied with natural gas by the defendant and
had built up a system of pipelines and business connections in
reliance upon supplies of a certain volume and constancy. Because
of defendant's failure to maintain the promised supply, plaintiff
claimed its business had suffered considerably in the past and was
at present losing and would continue to lose patronage. Specific
performance was sought with an alternative prayer for damages,
past, present and future. The court found that plaintiff had made
89330 Il. App. 136, 70 N. E. (2d) 626 (1947).
90 330 II. App. 540, 71 N. E. (2d) 799 (1947).
91330 IMl. App. 343, 71 N. E. (2d) 199 (1947).
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out a proper case for damages, but limited the recovery to compensation for the loss of profits from only the definite and known
customers. This, it was thought, complied with prior decisions
requiring that there be a "fair degree of probability" as a basis
for awarding damages for the loss of prospective profits.
One striking statutory change has been made in the law of
damages. Only compensatory damages may hereafter be recovered in any action sounding in alienation of affections, criminal conversation or breach of promise to marry, for all punitive
damage is forbidden therein and any punishment for offenders of
that character is to be administered through application of the
92
criminal laws.
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The time within which to appeal from judgments entered in
courts of record is regulated by the Civil Practice Act, 93 but as
that statute is inapplicable to forcible entry and detainer proceedings94 a person seeking to appeal from an adverse judgment
therein is required to act in a much more speedy fashion.9 5 The
fact that, on appeal from a decision of a justice of peace, the forcible detainer proceedings are heard de novo in a court of record
9 6 in any
does not, under the holding in Prasnikarv. Harmeling,
way change the situation or make the Civil Practice Act provision
regulating the time within which to appeal control. As a consequence, appeal in such cases must be taken within five days rather
than within the ninety days allotted in other civil cases. 97
Not only must the appeal be taken within proper time but it
must be based on a proper notice of appeal. That notice can confer appellate jurisdiction only over orders entered at the time the
92 Laws 1947, p. 796, S. B. 562; p. 1181, S. B. 563, and p. 800, S. B. 552. These
provisions appear in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, at Ch. 68, §§ 34 and 41, and in Ch. 89, § 25.
93 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 200.
94 Ibid., § 125.

95 Ibid., Ch. 57, § 19.
96 329 Ill. App. 341, 68 N. E. (2d) 542 (1946).
97 The holding in Gentle v. Butler, 278 Ill. App. 371 (1935), and In Veach v.
Hendricks, 278 Ill. App. 376 (1935), was there repudiated. Since those decisions,
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act has been amended to cure the defect therein
noted. See Laws 1937, p. 611: Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 19.
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notice is given, according to Savit v. Chicago Title & Trust Company,9 8 hence the court is not empowered to pass on a judgment or
decree rendered subsequent thereto even though the later order
be one modifying or amending the order actually appealed from.
There is also no authority, under that decision, for the higher
court to accept the case as if on leave to appeal granted pursuant
to Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act 99 for that remedy is to be
regarded as available only where time has run on the right to use
a notice of appeal.
It has long been the law that no appeal can be taken from an
order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint for, at that stage
of the case, the essential finality required for an appealable order
is lacking. 1 A way around that rule, at least in some equity proceedings, appears to be suggested by the determination in Peterson v. Grisell.2 In that case, plaintiff sued to enjoin an attempted
redemption from a foreclosure sale. A temporary injunction was
entered on stipulation. Thereafter the defendants filed a single
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action and also for dissolution of the temporary injunction. That
motion was denied in toto. On appeal taken by the defendants
from that order, the plaintiff urged that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of an appealable order but the court nevertheless
retained the case on the ground that the denial of a motion to vacate or dissolve an injunction does support an appeal.3 Having
retained the case for that purpose, the court then declared that, in
the interest of the prompt termination of litigation, it should also
go into the question of the sufficiency of the complaint and, upon
so doing, found that that motion to dismiss had been properly
denied as the complaint clearly stated a cause of action. It therefore affirmed with direction to enter a final judgment for plaintiff on the undisputed facts.
98 329 Ill. App. 277, 68 N. E. (2d) 472 (1946), superseding opinion in 328 Ill. App.
129, 65 N. E. (2d) 130 (1946).
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 200.
1 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 201, and American Radiator & Sanitary Corp. v. Wilhelmi, 308
111. App. 316, 31 N. E. (2d) 277 (1941), abst. opin.
2 330 Il1. App. 587, 71 N. E. (2d) 832 (1947).
3 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 202, and Naprawa v. Flat Janitors' Union
382 I1.

124, 46 N. E. (2d)

27 (1943).
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Further review of a decision rendered by one of the Illinois
Appellate Courts is permissible only under the circumstances set
forth in Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act 4 and, if no certificate
of importance is issued, the presence of the jurisdictional amount
can be determined only by reference to the judgment sought to
be reviewed. It was urged, in Matthews v. Trinity Universal Insurance Company,' that the jurisdictional feature was present,
when the Appellate Court reversed a judgment dismissing plaintiff's action on a penal bond and directed judgment thereon if no
further defense was offered, for the reason that such judgment,
when entered, would be in excess of $1500. The Supreme Court,
however, sustained a motion to dismiss the appeal to it on the
ground that resort to -the pleadings to determine the amount of
the claim would be improper as the judgment itself provided the
only criterion of that fact. As the judgment therein specified no
amount whatever, additional review could only be granted upon
certificate of importance and none had been issued.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

No new paths were charted in the law relating to the enforcement of judgments and decrees but a few cases do cast illumination in the darker corners thereof. In Mohr v. Sibthorp,6
for example, the right of a spouse of a judgment debtor to secure
relief from the sale of land on execution was considered. The
premises there involved, worth over $20,000, had been sold at
judgment sale for $1,714, but no effort had been made to set off
7
to the debtor's spouse the value of her inchoate right of dower.
The spouse was allowed to redeem, despite the fact that the redemption period had expired, on the ground that it was the policy
of this state, where no innocent parties were involved, to permit
redemption where the judgment creditor might otherwise gain a
benefit he was not entitled to as by acquiring valuable property
at relatively little or no outlay. But the court was equally firm,
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 199.
397 Ill. 174, 73 N. E.

(2d)

284 (1947).

6395 Ill. 418, 69 N. E. (2d) 487 (1947).
7 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 14a, repealed by Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 3.
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in Ba uman v. Schoaff,8 in denying to the holder of an unrecorded
deed to vacant land any right to move to vacate the sale thereof
made by an execution creditor under a judgment against the former owner even though that judgment was rendered subsequent
to the execution and delivery of the deed. Such a person was
deemed entitled to no equities in view of the fact that he was not
only no party to the judgment proceeding but had also failed to
preserve his rights by prompt recording.9
That there are important distinctions between the use of
scire facias to revive a judgment and a separate proceeding in
debt based upon the existence of a judgment is forcibly borne out
in the case of Industrial National Bank of Chicago v. Shalin.10 In
the case of the former, the court must necessarily have jurisdiction
of all the parties to the original judgment so that, if one has died
since the entry thereof, revival is not possible. But, in the case of
the latter, as the judgment binds all debtors jointly and severally,
jurisdiction over any one of them is enough to support a new judgment1 1 even though it would be impossible to acquire jurisdiction
over the others. The fact that the relief by way of an action in
debt is sought in the same court as the one in which the original
judgment was entered does not operate to change these principles,
so it was decided in that case that it was error to dismiss a complaint in debt on grounds which would have been valid only if the
12
relief sought had been by way of scire facias proceedings.
Some issues as to garnishment and attachment may be
noted.' 3 A common provision in public liability and similar insurance policies requires that the insured, when requested, will
8331 IMi. App. 38, 72 N. E. (2d) 571 (1947).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 29, declares an unrecorded deed to be void as to
all "creditors and subsequent purchasers." The term "creditors" has been held to
include judgment creditors.
10330 Ill. App. 498, 72 N. E. (2d) 52 (1947).
'- Fender v. Stiles, 31 Ill. 460 (1863).
12 The court again bad occasion to point out that a motion to dismiss should
'point out specifically the defects complained of," and that it is not proper for the
court to consider other grounds orally urged on it: 330 Ill. App. 498 at 501, 72 N. E.
(2d) 52 at 54.
L3The only legislative change consists of a short amendment to the Attachments
Act which now makes it unnecessary for the state government, its departments or
officers, to file a bond as plaintiff in any such proceeding: Laws 1947, p. 292. 5. B.
296; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 11, § 4a.
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co-operate with and aid the insurer in the defense of litigation
growing out of matters covered by the policy. If there is breach
of such a provision by the insured, that fact will operate as a defense in case the insurer is subjected to garnishment proceedings
based on the policy for if there is no liability to the insured there
can be none as to his judgment creditor. 14 The case of Patton v.
Washington Insurance Exchange" had indicated that a failure on
the part of the insured to respond to a demand from the insurer
for assistance was enough to serve as a defense for the court there
said it was the duty of the insured "to keep in touch with his attorneys" in regard to proceedings involving liability under the
policy. It was, therefore, urged in Du:rbin for use of Ferdman v.
Lord 6 that the failure of the insured to notify the insurer of a
change of address, so that it was impossible to communicate notice to him of his desired assistance in defending the principal
claim, should be a sufficient breach of duty to avoid liability on the
policy. The court, however, held otherwise indicating that as it
did not appear that the insured was concealing himself in order
to defraud the insurer the fact of removal alone did not amount
to a breach of the provision calling for co-operation. In Hart v.
Evans 7 the simple question was whether the holder of an unliquidated claim on which suit was pending was a creditor within the
meaning of the Bulk Sales Act. The court, despite many persuasive reasons urged for a contrary holding, decided he was not. It
is rather difficult to understand, therefore, why the court should
devote so much space to a discussion of the sufficiency of the
affidavit made by the seller. It did, however, say that an affidavit
based on "information and belief" was not sufficient since if an
indictment charging the making of a false statement under the
Bulk Sales Act had been based thereon 8 it would not survive a
motion to quash.
14 Ancateau v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 553. 48 N. E. (2d) 440
(1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 82. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 73, § 1000.
15 288 Ill. App. 594, 6 N. E. (2d) 472 (1937).
16 329 Ill. App. 333, 68 N. E. (2d) 537 (1946).
17 330 Ill. App. 385, 71 N. E. (2d) 546 (1947).
IS Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 79.
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
As might be expected, little has been said during this period
with respect to the substantive elements of a crime. One case,
that of People v. Jones,1 involved an alleged public nuisance in
permitting a well drilled for oil or gas to remain unplugged after
the abandonment thereof.2 The defense was that the action was
barred for failure to initiate proceedings within eighteen months
after the cessation of production. In answer thereto, the court
explained that the acts constituting the public nuisance were not
consummated when the well was abandoned and the nuisance first
appeared but rather continued as long as the well remained uncapped, for it was the conduct of permitting the well to remain
uncapped rather than the original abandonment 'which was the
real subject of the statutory prohibition. It also held that the
law was not rendered invalid as being an ex post facto statute for
each day of omission constituted a new occurrence hence there
was no occasion to consider whether the statute made acts unlawful which were not unlawful at the time they originally took
place. In cases of that character, however, the judgment is limited to the criminal penalty only and may not, according to People
v. Livingston,4 also include an order that the defendant abate the
nuisance. It was, therefore, there held error for a county court
to impose an additional penalty for contempt of court for refusing
to abate the nuisance in question.
Another case which gives content to the substantive definition of a breach of the peace is City of Chicago v. Terminiello5
wherein the defendant was arrested for aiding in the creation of
a riot, disturbance and breach of peace, in violation of a city ordinance,6 by the use of insulting and abusive language in a speech
1329 Il1. App. 503, 69 N. E. (2d) 522 (1946).
2 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 466.
a Ibid., § 631.
4331 II. App. 313, 73 N. E. (2d) 136 (1947).
5 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. (2d) 45 (1947). Niemeyer, P.J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
6 Mun. Code 1939, Ch. 193, § 1(1).

